Abstract
Introduction
Critical systems [25] are ubiquitous in today's interconnected society. For instance, failures in safety-critical systems result in life loss, or damage to the environment (e.g., nuclear plant management system); failures in missioncritical systems result in failure of goal-directed activities (e.g., spacecraft navigation system); and failures in business-critical systems result in economic losses (e.g., bank accounting system). In this scenario, dependability (i.e., availability, safety, reliability, maintainability, integrity) becomes a strong requirement for critical systems [3] .
To deploy dependable systems, designers need to detect and remove errors and limit damage caused by failures. Several frameworks have been proposed to model and assess the dependability of critical systems [5, 17, 23] . Most of them analyze all possible failures to deploy systems able to anticipate them even when they are very unlikely or insignificant. In this case, one can argue that the design is not cost-effective and decide to not invest on it.
Risk analysis has been proposed as a solution for prioritizing the strategies to mitigate failures by analyzing their likelihood and effects. This approach allows designers to adopt countermeasures only for the most critical failures. For instance, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [26] and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) [4] analyze failures on the basis of their likelihood and impacts and assess the dependability of the system in terms of its risks. However, these frameworks focus on the system-to-be and do not analyze the organizational setting in which the system itself will operate.
In this work, we propose a refined framework for assessing risk at organizational level over what has been proposed in [1] . The first contribution is the introduction of social relations that makes possible to compute the risk by considering the contributions of different actors. An actor of the system may not have the capabilities to meet his responsibilities by himself, and so he depends on other actors for it. These social relations significantly affect the dependability of high-reliable organizations [8] . The second contribution is the introduction of the notion of trust to extend the risk assessment process. The assignment of responsibilities is typically driven by the level of trust towards other actors [10, 24] . Trust is a subjective probability that defines the expectation of an actor about profitable behavior of another actor [10] . A low level of trust increases the risk perceived by the depender about the achievement of his objectives. The new constructs have been formalized so that the risk of the system can be formally analyzed through a tool-supported process. Using the framework proposed in this paper, an actor can assess the risk in delegating the fulfillment of his objectives and decide whether or not the risk is acceptable.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Next, we introduce an Air Traffic Management system used as a running example throughout the paper. In Section 3, we provide a brief description of the Goal-Risk modeling framework and describe the basic concepts that we use for assessing risk in organizational settings. In Section 4, we extend the framework by introducing the notion of trust. In Section 5, we explain how to assess risk based on trust relations. Finally, we discuss related works in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
A Safety-Critical System
This section introduces the Air Traffic Management (ATM) case study [7] that has been studied in the SEREN-ITY Project 1 for the validation of Security & Dependability patterns. An ATM system is managed by an authorized body, called Air Traffic Control Center (ACC) that provides air traffic control (ATC) services in a particular airspace. ATC services are comprised of controlling aircraft, managing airspace, managing flight data of controlled aircraft, and providing information on air traffic situation.
Suppose that there are two adjacent ACCs (e.g., ACC-A and ACC-B) as depicted in Fig. 1 . Each ACC divides its airspace into several adjacent volumes, called sectors. One day in a summer holiday period, Paul receives a flight bulletin that indicates an air traffic increase in the next 6 hours. Based on the planner analysis, the air traffic will be beyond the threshold that Edison can safely handle. Therefore, Scott must take some precautions to handle this situation. In particular, he has two possibilities:
• Dividing the airspace into smaller sectors. In this case, controllers cover smaller areas, but the supervisor have to supervise a greater number of sectors.
• Delegate part of the airspace to an adjacent supervisor.
This can be in either the same ACC or a different ACC.
To apply airspace division, Scott must have available resources: a controlling team and a pair of controller workstation, called Controller Working Position (CWP), for the team. Unfortunately, in the summer holiday all team and CWPs are occupied to manage existing sectors. Therefore, the only alternative to handle the increase without applying any restrictions to incoming traffic, is partial airspace delegation. Based on the Paul analysis, Scott can delegate the Fig. 1 ) either to Susan or Spencer. Before proceeding, Scott must be sure that the target supervisor (e.g., Susan or Spencer) has infrastructures (e.g., radar and radio coverage) to provide ATC services in the increased airspace and define a delegation schema to rule the partial airspace delegation.
Actually, Scott has different expectation from the different supervisors due to the personal closeness, the easiness in communication, and air traffic similarities. For instance, Scott and Susan work in the same ACC so that they should not have problems in the coordination of the increased airspace during partial airspace delegation. Conversely, the air traffic in sector 1-B has many similarities with the one in the increased airspace. Therefore, from Scott's perspective, Spencer can handle the traffic in the increased airspace more efficiently.
To decide to whom increase airspace should be delegated, Scott needs to assess the risks of each alternative. To support the management of critical systems, we propose a framework for assessing risks using trust relations among actors as evidence besides the capabilities of service providers.
Tropos Goal-Risk Framework
The Tropos Goal Risk Model (GR-Model) [2] represents requirements models as graphs G, R , where G are nodes and R are relations. G is comprised of three constructs: goal, task, and event. Goals (depicted as ovals) are strategic interests that actors intend to achieve. Events (depicted as pentagons) are uncertain circumstance out of the control of actors that can have an impact on the achievement of goals. Tasks (depicted as hexagons) are sequences of actions used to achieve goals or to treat the effects of events. TEach of above constructs is characterized by two attributes: SAT and DEN. Such attributes represent the values 4 of evidence that the goal can be satisfied and respectively the evidence that the goal can be denied. Their values are qualitatively represented in the range of {(F)ull,(P)artial,(N)one}, with the intended meaning F > P > N. R consists of AND/OR decomposition and contribution relations. AND/OR decomposition relations are used to refine goals, tasks, and events in order to produce a finer structure. Contribution relations are used to model the impacts of a node over another node. We distinguish 4 types of contribution relations: +,++,−, and −−. Each type can propagate one type of evidence, either SAT or DEN, or both types of evidence. For instance, the ++ contribution relation indicates that the relation delivers both SAT and DEN, whereas the ++ S contribution relation means the relation only delivers SAT evidence to the target goal.
The GR-Model consists of three conceptual layers of analysis [2] as shown in Fig. 2: Goal layer analyzes the goals of each actor and identifies which tasks the actor needs to perform to achieve the goals; Event layer models uncertain events along their effects to the goal layer; Treatment layer identifies specific tasks (also called treatments) that should be introduced to change the consequences of effect of event layer (i.e., mitigate) towards goal layer.
In this paper we extend the GR-Model to support risk analysis beyond the rationale of single actors. To this intent, we introduce the notion of actor in the GR-Model. The formal definition of GR-Model becomes (A, G), R where A is a set of actors. The extended GR-Model allows us to compute the evidence of fulfillment of the same goal from the perspective of different actors. For instance, Spencer may have full evidence that goal manage sector 1-A with the support of another SU(G 1b )will be satisfied, whereas Scott may have only partial evidence that G 1b will be satisfied.
This extension requires refining the predicates used to represent SAT and DEN values, as follow:
actor A has none evidence that node N will be satisfied [denied]
Figure 2. Goal-Risk Model of ATM case study
Relations among nodes are represented as N) where r can be a contribution or decomposition relation, (A 1 , N 1 ) , . . . , (A 1 , N n ) are called source nodes, and (A 2 , N) is the target node of relation r. All source nodes must belong to the same actor, while the target node can be referred to a different actor. In decomposition relations, source nodes and target nodes must belong to the same actor, while in contribution relations, they might be in the same actor or different ones.
The axioms to propagate SAT and DEN values over traditional Tropos goal models [16] also need to be revised to accommodate the notion of actor. The new axiomatization is presented in Fig. 3 . Axioms (1)-(2) formalize the SAT and DEN propagation over goal models: if a node has (at least) full evidence of satisfaction (or denial), it also has (at least) partial evidence of satisfaction (or denial). Similarly, a node that has (at least) partial evidence, also has (at least) none evidence.
Axioms (3)- (8) define how SAT and DEN evidence of nodes are calculated on the basis of the evidence of their AND-subparts. In particular, the SAT evidence of a top node follows the lowest SAT evidence of its subparts (Axioms (3)- (5)), whereas the DEN evidence follows the highest DEN values (Axioms (6)- (8)). For instance, in Fig. 2 Scott AND-decomposes goal manage the traffic in sector 1-A (G 3 ) into subgoals control the traffic in sector 1-A (G 4 ) and manage the airspace of sector 1-A(G 5 ). To satisfy (9)- (14)) behave conversely from the ones for AND-decomposition. For instance, in Fig. 2 Scott intends to satisfy manage sector 1-A (G 1 ). This goal can be achieved either by fulfilling manage sector 1-A by itself(G 1a ) or manage sector 1-A with the support of another SU(G 1b ). It is sufficient that Scott fulfills one of these OR-subgoals to satisfy G 5 . Axioms (15)-(28) cope with contribution relations. These axioms are applied when contribution relations are both in intra-actor (i.e., source node and target node are laid in the same actor) and inter-actor (i.e., source node and target node are laid in different actors). In particular, when the relation is inter-actor, it means that evidence that an actor has on the satisfaction or denial of a goal affect the evidence that another actor has on the satisfaction or denial of 
ND(A, N2) ∧ ND(A, N3) → ND(A, N1) (14)
N 2 x −→ N1 : NS(A1 , N2) → NS(A2 , N1) 5 (15) ND(A1 , N2) → ND(A2 , N1)(16)N 2 ++ S −→ N1 : F S(A1 , N2) → F S(A2 , N1) (17) P S(A1 , N2) → P S(A2 , N1)(18)N 2 + S −→ N1 : P S(A1 , N2) → P S(A2 , N1)(19)N2 −− S −→ N1 : F S(A1 , N2) → F D(A2 , N1) (20) P S(A1 , N2) → P D(A2 , N1)(21)N2 − S −→ N1 : P S(A1 , N2) → P D(A2 , N1)(22)N 2 ++ D −→ N1 : F D(A1 , N2) → F D(A2 , N1) (23) P D(A1 , N2) → P D(A2 , N1)(24)N 2 + D −→ N1 : P D(A1 , N2) → P D(A2 , N1)(25)N2 −− D −→ N1 : F D(A1 , N2) → F S(A2 , N1) (26) P D(A1 , N2) → P S(A2 , N1)(27)N2 − D −→ N1 : P D(A1 , N2) → P S(A2 , N1)(28)5 x ∈ {++ S , + S , −− S , − S , ++ D , + D , −− D , − D };
Trust in GR Model
An actor might not have all capabilities to fulfill his goals and tasks. Tropos introduces the notion of dependency to deal with this issue. In [14] , we proposed a conceptual refinement of dependency by introducing the notions of delegation and trust. Delegation is used to model the transfer of responsibilities from an actor (the delegator) to another (the delegatee). By delegating the fulfillment of a goal, the delegator becomes vulnerable because, if the delegatee fails to fulfill the assigned responsibilities, the delegator will not be able to achieve his objectives. Thereby, such a situation introduces risks that decrease the dependability of the system. Trust relations are used to model the expectation of an actor (the trustor) about the behavior of another actor (the trustee) in achieving a goal. Together with the notion of trust, we adopt also the notion of distrust [15] . This relation is used to model the belief of an actor about the misbehavior of another actor in achieving a goal.
We intend to assess the risk beyond the perspective of single actors by adopting the notions of delegation (D), trust (T) and distrust (S) in addition to contribution and decomposition. Indeed, trust and distrust relations can be seen as potential evidence for assessing the risks [10] . Trusting another actor implies that the trustor has considerable subjective probability that the trustee will fulfill his responsibility towards the trustor. Trust and distrust relations are indicated by ternary predicates trust-rel and distrust-rel, respectively. The first parameter represents the trustor, the second the trustee, and the last the goal intended to be achieved or the task intended to be executed. We also introduce the notion of trust level that allows us to simplify later notation. In particular, we have considered three trust levels: Trust, Distrust, and NTrust (i.e., neither trust nor distrust). The last is necessary since the requirements specification may not define any trust or distrust relation between two specific actors.
Axioms in Fig. 4 are introduced to calculate the transitive closure of trust relations and the corresponding trust level on the basis of trust relations. We assume the following order of trust: Distrust > T rust > N T rust. This choice can be regarded as a particular instantiation of the denial-takes-precedence principle [18] . This corresponds to a conservative approach which discredits all trust relations in presence of a distrust relation.
Axioms (29) and (31) propagate trust/distrust relations over AND/OR refinement. The idea is that if an actor be- -rel(A 1 , A 2 , G) ∧ trust-rel(A 1 , A 2 , G) → T rust(A 1 , A 2 , G) (34) ¬distrust-rel(A 1 , A 2 , G) ∧ ¬trust-rel(A 1 , A 2 , G) → NT rust(A 1 , A 2 , G) (35) lieves that another actor will (not) achieve a goal or execute a task, the first also believes that the latter will (not) fulfill its sub-parts. For instance, in Fig. 5 Scott trusts Edison for achieving goal control the traffic in sector 1-A (G 4 ). In this setting, Scott also trusts Edison in achieving both goals control the current traffic in sector 1-A (G 8 ) and manage the incoming traffic in sector 1-A (G 9 ) which are subgoals (AND-decomposition) of G 4 .
Axiom (30) computes the transitive closure of trust relations. 6 It infers indirect relations of trust between two The first is a direct distrust relation, while the latter is an indirect (i.e., it is inherited from goal G 4 as shown above) trust relation. Since Distrust takes precedence over T rust, the trust level between Scott and Edison for achieving G 8 is Distrust. These axioms are also used to assess trust level when there are multi-paths of trust between them.
The axioms shown in Fig. 6 extend the formal framework to assess risks by specifying how SAT and DEN evidence are propagated along trust relations. Axioms (36)-(41) cope with situations where the trust level is Trust . In this case, the evidence from the trustor viewpoint is the same with the ones of the trustee. For instance, in Fig. 5 Scott trusts Edison to control the traffic in sector 1-A (G 4 ). If Edison has full SAT evidence on G 4 (i.e., F S(Edison, G 4 )) then Scott has also full SAT evidence (i.e., F S(Scott, G 4 )).
Conversely, if an actor distrusts another actor, the trustor will have null SAT evidence and full DEN evidence whatever the evidence of the trustee (Axioms (42)-(43)). AcMore complex trust metrics can be adopted in a quantitative approach. Assessment( (A, G) end for 10: until {old=current} cording such axioms, a delegation in presence of a distrust relation between the delegator and the delegatee is risky for the delegator. For instance, Scott distrusts Spencer to manage sector 1-A(G 1b ) and Spencer is the one who has evidence about its satisfaction (or denial). From the viewpoint of Scott, goal G 1b has null evidence of being satisfied (i.e., NS(Scott, G 1b )) and full evidence of being denied (i.e., ND(Scott, G 1b )) independently from the evidence in Spencer's viewpoint because Scott does not trust Spencer in fulfilling G 1b . Thereby, if Scott must delegate the fulfillment of goal G 1b to Spencer, such a delegation is very risky from Scott's perspective. Yet, this may turn out to be the only alternative available at the moment.
Algorithm 1 Risk
Finally, axioms (44)-(49) define rules propagating evidence when the trust level is NTrust. They reduce SAT evidence and increase DEN evidence.
Risk Assessment Algorithm
The assessment process is performed using Algorithm 1. The algorithm calculates SAT and DEN values for each node (node labels). The algorithm takes in input a GR-Model (A, G), R and an input label , a two-dimension array (i.e., actors, nodes). This array contains initial node labels (e.g., full/partial/null SAT and DEN) from the perspective of each actor. Before assessing risks, the algorithm computes the trust level between actors (line 1) by applying axioms (29)-(35) and stores the result in array T rustBase. Then, the algorithm (line 7) applies all the other axioms to collect evidence for all nodes in each actor viewpoint (i.e., N j is requested by A i ). The process terminates when there is no change between the current labels and the previous ones.
The risk assessment algorithm uses procedure Apply Rules (Algorithm 2) to combine the evidence for the node N j in actor A i viewpoint (i.e., (A i , N j ) ). The evidence is computed from all its incoming relations (i.e., decomposition, contribution, and trust relations). Lines 4-5 compute SAT or DEN evidence derived from decomposition/contribution relations. In particular, sat rules and cess. The idea is that a trust relation between two actors will be established only if the risk in delegating the fulfillment of a service is acceptable for the delegator. This framework is orthogonal to our approach. Indeed, we use trust as evidence to assess the risk of the system, whereas Jøsang and Presti use risk to assess trust relations among actors.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an extension of the Tropos Goal-Risk framework. Particularly, we have proposed an approach to assess risk on the basis of trust relations among actors. The work is still in progress and we are currently working on introducing the notion of permission for assessing dependability of secure systems. Another direction is to extend the framework to support quantitative risk analysis rather than only qualitative analysis.
